
Will Costa Rica’s New Extradition Agreement with the US Curb Growing Drug Trafficking?

Costa Rica’s recent extradition agreement with the United States brings the growing drug-trafficking hub in line with other key nations in the region, but perennial doubts over the effectiveness of the measure in the fight against organized crime remain.
President Rodrigo Chaves signed a constitutional amendment at the end of May allowing the extradition of Costa Rican nationals for international drug trafficking and terrorism offenses. The reform was passed with significant legislative support, receiving 44 out of 57 votes in its final debate.
This move responds to growing concerns over the judiciary’s capacity to effectively prosecute high-level criminal cases — particularly amid escalating drug-related violence. Recent years have seen a marked increase in judicial corruption, with cases more than doubling between 2019 and 2023. In June 2024 alone, authorities apprehended 20 state employees in one week, over half of whom worked in the court system.
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According to Osvaldo Ramírez Miranda, Sub-Chief of the Section against Organized Crime at the Judicial Investigation Organism (OIJ), the reform also seeks to strengthen cohesion at both the national and international levels. The initiative reflects strong alignment across the branches of Costa Rica’s government, “which promoted this reform from the Constitutional Court to the Legislative Assembly as part of their national security agenda,” he told InSight Crime. Internationally, the measure brings Costa Rica in line with countries that already permit the extradition of their own citizens, addressing a long-standing lack of reciprocity in judicial cooperation.
InSight Crime Analysis
Although Costa Rica’s extradition reform has been welcomed by officials as a step forward, regional precedents cast doubts about the measure’s effectiveness in curbing organized crime.
Ramírez suspects its impact is likely to be limited, as the reform focuses exclusively on drug trafficking and terrorism. Meanwhile, organized crime has adapted by decentralizing and diversifying, engaging in cyber fraud, extortion, illegal mining, and human trafficking — areas which often fall outside the scope of these agreements. The reform also fails to address the structural drivers of organized crime, such as rising drug demand in international markets or the lack of licit employment opportunities that push individuals to engage in criminal networks.
These factors have undermined similar efforts elsewhere in the region, where extradition has failed to deliver lasting results.
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The most recent and comparable case is Ecuador. President Daniel Noboa took office in late 2023 amid unprecedented violence. As part of his crackdown on gangs, he called for a national referendum on April 21, 2024, which approved constitutional reforms allowing the extradition of Ecuadorian citizens.
However, the security situation remains dire. In January, 781 murders were reported, making it the deadliest month in recent years. Many of these are directly linked to the illegal drug trade, in which Ecuador is playing a growing role. The country now serves as a major transit point for cocaine from neighboring Peru and Colombia, with a significant portion of the world’s cocaine flowing through its ports.
Another example is Colombia. Their extradition policy — ratified by a 1997 constitutional amendment — has helped weaken major criminal organizations by enabling the transfer of dozens of high-ranking leaders, including figures from the Cali, Norte del Valle, and Gulf clans, to face prosecution in the United States. Nevertheless, the country remains a regional crime hub.
While the measure has offered short-term victories in dismantling criminal networks, kingpin arrests and extraditions have often preceded spikes in violence. In 2008, the extradition of drug lord Diego Fernando Murillo, alias “Don Berna,” created a power vacuum that fueled violent turf battles, doubling Medellín’s homicide rates. More recently, in July 2022, the Gulf Clan launched an offensive following the extradition of its then-leader, Dairo Antonio Úsuga David, known as “Otoniel.” As some cartels fractured or lost leadership, others relocated operations abroad to avoid extradition risks, contributing to the spread of transnational organized crime, Brenes said.
Another example is Mexico. Despite an extradition treaty with the United States dating to 1861, Mexico historically resisted extraditing its own nationals, with the first extradition in 1995. This changed significantly at the turn of the century. Between 2000 and 2022, official records show Mexico extradited 1,389 people to the United States.
Recently, Sheinbaum’s presidency has seen Mexico-US cooperation prioritize enhanced security efforts. Still, Mexican criminal groups have expanded their territorial control from 10% to 30% of the country over the last decade, and their international influence has grown.
Similarly, Honduras’ 2012 constitutional amendment permitting the extradition of nationals accused of drug trafficking has seen several high-profile individuals sent to the United States. Notably, former President Juan Orlando Hernández and former police chief Juan Carlos Bonilla were extradited in 2022 and subsequently convicted in 2024 for conspiring to import over 500 tons of cocaine into the United States.
Viera-Chirinos and Elmer Matute, two prominent individuals in the local drug trade, were extradited in February 2024 and sentenced in March 2025, disrupting drug distribution networks. Despite these efforts, Honduras continues to grapple with persistent security challenges. The country faces rampant corruption and violence driven by both local and transnational criminal organizations. As of 2023, the homicide rate stood at 31 per 100,000 inhabitants, ranking as the eighth highest worldwide. In December 2022, the government declared a state of emergency to combat extortion and related crimes. This measure, which suspends certain constitutional rights, has been extended 15 times and remains in effect.
Another dynamic behind the reform in Costa Rica, however, seems more promising, which was the drive “to restrict and eliminate the entry of foreign criminals and drug traffickers seeking to become Costa Ricans to protect themselves from international justice,” said Mario Brenes, former regional advisor for Latin America at the Friedrich Naumann Foundation. For years, foreign criminals — especially from Colombia and Mexico — obtained citizenship through relatively accessible pathways like marriage, residency, or investment, and then used constitutional protections to evade prosecution after committing crimes abroad. “The justice system in that country could not request extradition simply because the Constitution did not allow it, encouraging impunity,” Brenes added. By closing this loophole, the amendment could end what has become a safe haven for transnational criminals.
Featured image: A member of the Costa Rican National Police. Credit: The Tico Times.
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