Who will be Vietnam’s next party boss?

Asia World

Author: Hai Hong Nguyen, Centre for Policy Futures UQ

The ruling Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) will hold its thirteenth National Congress in January 2021. Preparations for the most significant political event in the country have already begun. The question of who will be elected the next CPV general secretary — and the most powerful person in the country — is drawing a great deal of public attention.

Vietnam's Communist Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong speaks after being elected as Vietnam's State President during a National Assembly session in Hanoi, Vietnam, 23 October 2018 (Photo:Reuters).

Vietnam's Communist Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong speaks after being elected as Vietnam's State President during a National Assembly session in Hanoi, Vietnam, 23 October 2018 (Photo:Reuters).Several institutional and organisational reforms aiming to integrate the nation into the wider international community have taken place since the economic reforms of the late 1980s. But the CPV has not adapted its Soviet-style power structure at the national level that consists of three key bodies. They are the Central Committee, which makes decisions in the interval between congresses; the Politburo, which leads the implementation of resolutions adopted by the Congress and decides personnel issues; and the Secretariat, which oversees daily Party affairs.

The incumbent Party chief and state President Nguyen Phu Trong will likely retire — he has been unhealthy and would be excessively over the age limit for leaders as set out in his own regulations. Trong is also bound to the Party Constitution that prevents him from being elected for a third term in office. The vacancy Trong will leave has created room for Vietnamese political observers to freely speculate.

There is also increased speculation on the way the CPV will install the next Party chief. In accordance with Regulation No. 90-QD/TW, the incoming general secretary must be selected among the incumbent Politburo members who have held their seat for at least a full term. By these guidelines, all 15 sitting Politburo members — not counting Trong and Dinh The Huynh (who is ill) — are qualified.

Only seven of the 15 members are under the age limit of 65. But some members can hold office for an additional 30 months as provided in a conclusive document newly issued by the Politburo. Among the remaining eight Politburo members whose age will be over the limit in early 2021, two are 68, four are 67, one is 66 and one 65. That means any of these eight members to be re-elected may be identified as ‘special cases’ if the Party wishes.

But it is likely that the two 68 year-old members — Standing Member of the Secretariat Tran Quoc Vuong and Party chief of Ho Chi Minh City Nguyen Thien Nhan — will not run. These two men’s retirement will make the politics behind the run for the general secretary post less complicated. The two 67 year-old members include current Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc and National Assembly Chairwoman Nguyen Thị Kim Ngan. They might continue in the Politburo as ‘special cases’. If so, one or both of them will probably take a higher position.

In June, the Politburo chaired by Trong after his recovery from a light stroke locked down a list of more than 200 candidates to be elected to the new central committee. But last month, this list was not mentioned in the publicly-announced agenda of the 11th Plenum — the last meeting of the CPV Central Committee in 2019. Unofficial reports said that it was on the table for deliberations.

Following tradition, there will be two more plenary meetings prior to the Congress. If the Party cannot reach a consensus on who to elect for general secretary in the final plenary, the Congress will decide — this happened in 2016 after speculated in-fighting between Trong and then prime minister Nguyen Tan Dung.

The puzzle at the moment is not about the Party general secretary position, but about the power-sharing mechanisms at the top level. Trong has been president since October 2018 after the sudden death of then president Tran Dai Quang. A critical question is whether the CPV will revert to the traditional ‘four pillars’ structure — consisting of the general secretary, president, prime minister and national assembly chairman — or whether it will formalise the current ‘three pillars’ structure with the general secretary-cum-president, prime minister, and national assembly chairman.

The second option seems to be preferred by the majority within the Party as it responds to both domestic and external interests. The CPV aims to buttress its power at home and also elevate its position abroad. While Trong has rejected the possibility of placing more power in the hands of one person, he himself is setting a precedent in Vietnam’s post-Doi Moi (renewal) era that a Party general secretary can concurrently take the presidency. Does the CPV’s search for its next boss implicitly mean that this person is also poised to be the next president?

According to Regulation No. 90, one of General Secretary Trong’s most important tasks is to ‘prepare’ his successor. This allows Trong to have significant influence on who replaces him, though he needs to win the Politburo and the Central Committee’s endorsement. The CPV tends to keep its top personnel-related discussions behind closed doors prior to a congress. The silence surrounding the CPV’s public agenda so far about the possible merging of these two positions reflects the Party’s dilemma. Understandably, it also is sensitive to Chinese influence.

Given the Party’s mute discussions in the public domain and in Vietnam’s single-party state where the media is run by the state, it is always risky and foolhardy to predict.

Hai Hong Nguyen is a Research Associate at the Centre for Policy Futures, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, the University of Queensland.