The imperfect peace established in February between Brazil’s two biggest criminal groups has become a failed truce after just two months, as local rivalries trump national orders.
On April 28, the Red Command (Comando Vermelho – CV) declared on social media that the truce with the First Capital Command (Primeiro Comando da Capital – PCC) was over as a result of clashes between the two groups.
The PCC also published a statement confirming the end of the ceasefire, saying that “just as the two groups came to a consensus about the alliance, the end occurred with respect and humility on both sides.”
One CV branch, however, declared “open war” on the PCC, calling them “enemies forever.”
According to intelligence reports cited in Brazilian media, the CV and PCC established the truce in February. The agreement’s goals were to improve criminal business by reducing unnecessary deaths and increasing cooperation on major drug trafficking routes, and to pressure the government into relaxing prison regulations.
Top leaders of both groups — PCC leader Marcos Willians Herbas Camacho, alias “Marcola,” and one of the CV’s top leaders, Márcio dos Santos Nepomuceno, alias “Marcinho VP” — are currently in maximum security prisons. Though they have been running their criminal operations from behind bars for years, the intelligence reports describe how they had hoped that by joining forces, they could negotiate with the government for better conditions.
“Both leaders are under a prison regime with severe isolation, so the truce may have been agreed upon through a game of telephone. The final result might not reflect what the leaders originally intended,” Carlos Cypriano, an academic who studies criminal dynamics at the State University of Rio de Janeiro, told InSight Crime.
Despite the ceasefire, violent confrontations continued between some sections of the two groups in March and April.
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A lasting truce between the PCC and CV was always unlikely because the two groups have very different leadership structures and capacity to enforce such a top-down mandate.
The PCC has a more hierarchical structure, with members organized into command cells called sintonias. Each sintonia has a different responsibility, like trafficking, finances, or legal defense. The organization’s top leaders make decisions that are then strictly enforced, and the punishment for disobedience can be severe.
“The PCC expands in a pyramidal, hierarchical way, so the small factions that join the organization throughout the country must follow their rules,” Cypriano said.
In contrast, the CV has more of a franchise model, with regional leaders given the authority to decide how they govern at the local level. This makes it easier for local wings to make alliances that benefit their operations, but more difficult to enforce a truce across all the branches.
From the beginning, some CV leaders did not agree to the truce. This was particularly evident in the northeastern state of Bahia, which is the site of intense criminal competition over local drug markets. In the weeks after the agreement was struck, violent clashes between the CV and PCC were reported in the cities of Ubatã, Jequié, Ibirataia, and Ibirapitanga. The states of Mato Grosso and Ceará also saw continued clashes between CV and PCC factions, according to local media.
Elsewhere, however, there were significant drops in violence while the truce was in place, local media reported. This was the case in the northern state of Acre and the central state of Mato Grosso do Sul, where disputes over control of the Caipira cocaine route were reduced by the agreement to cooperate in trafficking activities.
Although establishing a nationwide truce has proved difficult, the PCC and the CV may still cooperate in specific criminal activities.
“The gangs are pragmatic, so as long as it is in their interest, they will cooperate. The scenario is very dynamic,” Cypriano told InSight Crime.
Featured Image: Inmates in the Alcaçuz prison in 2017, the year that marked the escalation of the war between the PCC and the CV. Credit: Andressa Anholete.
