Myanmar’s civil–military maelstrom

Asia Politics World

Author: Marco Bünte, Friedrich–Alexander University Erlangen–Nuremberg

In the early hours of 1 February, the day before Myanmar’s newly elected parliament was about to convene, military officers detained State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint and other senior National League of Democracy (NLD) leaders. Myanmar Armed Forces (Tatmadaw) Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing seized power, made retired general Myint Swe the new president and declared a one-year state of emergency.

Myanmar military Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing looks at Myanmar pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi during Myanmar's top six-party talks at the Presidential palace in Nay Pyi Taw, 10 April 2015 (Photo: Reuters/Soe Zeya Tun).

Myanmar military Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing looks at Myanmar pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi during Myanmar's top six-party talks at the Presidential palace in Nay Pyi Taw, 10 April 2015 (Photo: Reuters/Soe Zeya Tun).

Why did the military end the 10-year tutelary regime that allowed it to hand over power to a civilian government while remaining in the backseat of politics, orchestrating and influencing developments from a position of strength? Why did the military, an organ that controls huge parts of the economy through lucrative military enterprises, pull the plug on this experiment?

Ultimately, the civil–military coalition between the NLD and the Tatmadaw was a marriage of inconvenience and military leaders increasingly clashed with civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi.

First, one of the military’s safeguards to prevent future loss of power, the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), failed to develop into the strong organisation envisaged by the Tatmadaw. Alongside the 25 per cent military representation in Myanmar’s parliaments, a strong USDP could have become a pillar of the quasi-civilian regime. But this safeguard fell with the dismal performance of the USDP in the 2015 and 2020 elections.

Second, Aung San Suu Kyi’s power sidestepped Article 59(f) of the Constitution, a provision drafted by the military in 2008 that prevents citizens with immediate family members holding foreign citizenship from holding the presidency. The provision had been clearly directed at Aung San Suu Kyi.

The NLD circumvented the article by introducing the State Counsellor Law in 2016, allowing Aung San Suu Kyi to take up a position at the helm of government. When the NLD pushed the law through parliament, military representatives furiously complained about ‘bullying by the democratic majority’, though they eventually accepted the move.

Third, the Tatmadaw was furious that the NLD wanted to change the military-drafted Constitution and limit the power of the military in 2015 and 2020. They managed to prevent this with their constitutional veto powers.

Fourth, the military designed the National Security and Defense Council (NDSC) in 2011 as the key body for discussing national security issues. Under Aung San Suu Kyi, the body did not convene. Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing repeatedly demanded that Aung San Suu Kyi convene the NDSC, while she decided to appoint her own civilian advisers.

The frequent NLD–Tatmadaw clashes resulted from a lack of trust. Neither side saw the other as the legitimate leader. Min Aung Hlaing viewed Aung San Suu Kyi’s role as unconstitutional, since the State Counsellor position is not provided for in the 2008 constitution, while Aung San Suu Kyi did not trust Min Aung Hlaing, who holds an unelected position of state power. This personal mistrust led to a lack of coordination — the last personal meeting between the two was reportedly in 2018.

When the State Counsellor’s domestic popularity reached an all-time high after she defended the generals at the International Criminal Court in The Hague in December 2019, Aung San Suu Kyi seemed to have gained the upper hand, particularly since Min Aung Hlaing’s post was coming to an end in 2021. Her management of the COVID-19 outbreak lent her additional legitimacy.

Aung San Suu Kyi’s popularity was confirmed by her landslide victory in the November 2020 elections. The results ended all speculation about Min Aung Hlaing taking up a position in a USDP government, since the party performed even worse than in 2015. This prepared the ground for a struggle over the election outcome.

The USDP and other military proxy parties had already approached the Commander-in-Chief in August 2020 about intervening if the Union Election Commission (UEC) ‘played foul’. Since the UEC was appointed by the NLD government, parties close to the military apparently did not trust the election’s management.

After the elections and the repeated dismal performance of the USDP, the military gave in to the pressures of its proxy-party. They allegedly found major irregularities in the voter lists and demanded a dissolution of the UEC and new elections, even though local and international election observers reported that the elections, despite shortcomings, reflected the will of the people.

Meetings between senior military officers and the NLD found no solution. Neither the military nor the NLD gave in. While the NLD could point to the principle of democratic choice, the military commander needed a strong USDP to place retired military officers into political positions. The military accused the UEC of failing to ensure free, transparent and fair elections. From its perspective, under Article 417 of the Constitution, it was then the ‘military’s duty to intervene’ and declare a one-year state of emergency. This falls in line with the military’s role as the Constitution’s guardian and protector.

There is a clear contradiction in this line of argument — a state of emergency is only constitutional when invoked by the president. But the president was arrested and refused to sign the emergency decree. The intervention is ultimately a military coup, launched due to fear of being sidelined by the NLD.

Marco Bünte is Professor at the Institute for Political Science, Friedrich–Alexander University of Erlangen–Nuremberg, Co-Editor of the Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs and associate at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies.