As record flows of cocaine reached consumers around the globe in 2024, criminal organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean have adapted to law enforcement pressure, swapping hegemonic hierarchies for complex networks.

The past year broke records for both cocaine production and use. Coca cultivation in Colombia, the main cocaine producer country, has been surging since 2020. Authorities nearly matched the amount of cocaine seized through 2023 in only nine months in 2024. And a report analyzing wastewater, primarily in Europe, showed a continued expansion of cocaine consumption.

This article is part of our Criminal GameChangers series for 2024. Read the other articles in the series here.

InSight Crime co-directors Steven Dudley and Jeremy McDermott will join some of our most experienced field investigators for a discussion of the Criminal GameChangers annual series and challenges for the year ahead. To attend and participate live, you can make a donation as small as $10.

The relentless growth of the cocaine industry has long fueled most of Latin America’s largest and most dominant criminal groups. Starting in the 1970s, rebel groups and criminal organizations began to focus on cocaine as a means to build their forces. Domineering criminal groups emerged, and took over every step of the supply chain.

The infamous figure of Pablo Escobar came to exemplify this structure in the 1980s. Starting with contraband, Escobar worked his way into the cocaine trade, building his Medellín Cartel into a deadly overlord of the criminal world. 

But when Escobar was killed in 1993, the Medellín Cartel collapsed. In subsequent years, other hierarchical groups met a similar fate, as rivals and law enforcement chipped away at their leaders. Removing top figures could lead to the implosion of the entire organization.

In response, networks emerged that have proven to be modular and resilient; interconnected and invisible. They can be disrupted but rarely dismantled, making them essential for handling the massive quantities of cocaine ceaselessly flowing in 2024.

Modular and Resilient

Today’s drug trafficking networks are composed of many smaller, interwoven nodes that can be swapped in and out without collapsing the overall criminal operation. This allows the network to survive even if key parts are taken out.

Having multiple players at each link in the supply chain is key. For example, the Brazilian gang, the First Capital Command (Primeiro Comando da Capital – PCC), has a variety of cocaine suppliers, from the ex-FARC mafia in Colombia to direct suppliers in Peru and Bolivia. 

They secure massive shipments of the drug from all three of the main producing nations, relying on a variety of cocaine producing groups. In the unlikely event that law enforcement in Colombia dismantled all of the ex-FARC groups, or Bolivia completely eliminated illicit coca production, the PCC would still be able to get its hands on cocaine thanks to its diversified supply network. 

SEE ALSO: InSight Crime’s 2023 Cocaine Seizure Round-Up

These sellers, in turn, are not selling exclusively to the PCC. The Central General Staff (Estado Mayor Central – EMC), one of the main ex-FARC groups, also allegedly sells to other Brazilian trafficking groups and to Mexico’s Sinaloa Cartel, which is one of the main traffickers of cocaine to the United States. 

Different cells of the PCC often make deals with other traffickers with scores of shadowy brokers setting up the deals. 

After securing cocaine from their various sources, the PCC works to transport the drug east, often relying on independent transporters to move the shipments across Paraguay or Brazil’s north until it gets to the coast. From there the PCC works with European groups, namely the ‘Ndrangheta and Balkan mafias, who buy the drug wholesale and then sell it throughout Europe.

The sheer number of buyers and sellers ensures that 2024’s record quantities of cocaine flow steadily around the world – even if one of the main groups falls.

Interconnected and Invisible

The various links and nodes throughout a network complicate law enforcement investigations. With so many different actors, mapping the entire criminal web is nearly impossible. Even if authorities can infiltrate a cell, it can be difficult to extend the investigation to understand the broader network.

Often, cells are linked only through certain individuals. Criminal groups may send an individual emissary abroad to conduct criminal dealings. There is no sudden appearance of a large group of people with different accents; no territory violently conquered and marked with graffiti. A small number of people can broker intercontinental drug deals while flying under authorities’ radars. 

And the subnetworks often have limited contact, operating through limited messaging and money transfers.

Modern technology has made this even easier. While face-to-face deals and international travel are still needed for some deals, many operations are now organized, executed, and paid for using telecommunications – without ever needing a stamp in someone’s passport.

Transnational criminal networks use widely available, free, encrypted messaging apps to run their businesses. While authorities have previously had great success with wiretaps to gather intelligence, encrypted messaging makes intercepting communications difficult and costly.

The increasing popularity of electronic payments means traffickers and buyers can do business without ever being in the same place or having to worry about the logistics of moving large volumes of physical currency. 

Cryptocurrencies make following the money through a network difficult, with new obfuscation techniques constantly being developed. Tumblers, or mixers, provide an additional layer of anonymity to cryptocurrencies. These services pool virtual coins together, blending them, before splitting the coins up again and sending the payment to the recipient. The seller gets the buyer’s payment, but it is nearly impossible to track.

Disrupted but Not Dismantled 

In order to combat these new networks, authorities will need to implement complementary strategies, including disrupting strategic links, exerting constant pressure on criminal networks, and tracking their financial flows.

Disrupting key links, such as halting the flow of cocaine through a major port like Brazil’s Santos — a primary departure point for cocaine bound for Europe — could significantly impact drug flows. 

An unintentional example of this became clear during the COVID-19 pandemic. As the legal shipping routes traffickers co-opted to send cocaine internationally were locked down, these networks found their ability to move their product significantly reduced. Cocaine started being stockpiled in South America, locked in the continent far from lucrative consumer markets abroad.

SEE ALSO: Drug Traffickers Producing More Cocaine in Europe: EU Report

But as the effects of COVID waned, shipping returned to normal and the world became awash with cocaine yet again. This illustrates a key factor for making anti-cocaine trafficking operations effective against networks: constant pressure. 

As the resilience of networks is partially due to multiple nodes at each stage of the process, the fewer nodes there are, the more susceptible the network becomes to disruptions. And with constant pressure, operations may be able to dismantle groups faster than they can be replaced. However, as the pandemic illustrated, if the pressure is let up, the network will soon recover.

Dogged pressure showed how a subnetwork could be unwound in Operation A Ultranza PY, an international operation that investigated key players in the network of Sebastián Marset. A broker based in Paraguay, Marset built relationships with suppliers in Bolivia, coordinating cocaine flights into Paraguay and international shipments down the Paraná-Paraguay waterway. 

While Marset himself remains at large, this network has collapsed. His top partners began trials in 2024 and the mother of his children, who is also his alleged illicit business partner, was arrested in Spain. 

A Ultranza PY went after various levels of this network, kept up the pressure, and dismantled a vast collection of money laundering operations, fatally wounding Marset’s operations. 

But A Ultranza PY eventually reduced the pressure. Corruption persists in Paraguay and the operation was not extended. In 2024, we saw evidence that as the pressure eased up, others started filling in the gap and the PCC’s cocaine trafficking operations through Paraguay continue flowing smoothly – showing once again how networks can quickly bounce back from seemingly major blows.

#border #crime #latinamerica #news