How Guatemala’s Gang Crisis Reached a Boiling Point

Latin America News

Guatemala is returning to hardline security policies amid a resurgence of gang activity, two years after its president pledged a renewed approach to the problem. 

Upon taking office in January 2024, President Bernardo Arévalo placed gang-fueled extortion at the top of his security agenda. He promised a shift away from reactive policing toward targeting gang leaders who coordinate extortion rackets from behind bars.

But far from containing the gangs, efforts to isolate their leaders have instead sparked a wave of violence linked to the country’s dominant groups, Barrio 18 and the Mara Salvatrucha (MS13). A series of prison riots and attacks on security forces culminated in the declaration of a month-long state of emergency on January 18, temporarily restricting certain civil liberties and granting authorities powers to detain or interrogate suspects without prior court approval. 

SEE ALSO: Arévalo, One Year On: Is Guatemala’s President Losing the Fight Against Corruption?

The measures have enabled sweeping arrests, with roughly 3,300 people detained in less than a month. Officials say the crackdown reduced homicides and extortion, though analysts argue the arrests are unlikely to produce long-term security gains.

That Arévalo – long viewed as a moderate reformer – resorted to emergency powers underscores the strain on his security agenda. The state of emergency expired on February 16, and it remains unclear how the government will overcome the institutional shortcomings that have so far undermined its ability to maintain control.

InSight Crime examines how the country arrived at this point.

Reclaiming the Prison System 

Arévalo took office in an unexpected election victory in 2023, and with an inexperienced administration still finding its feet after months of political turbulence.

Security became an early focal point. Within days, then-Interior Minister Francisco Jiménez unveiled a strategy aimed at dismantling extortion networks, which for decades have fueled chronic insecurity and maintained Guatemala’s persistently high homicide rate.

The administration focused on disrupting communications inside the prison system, where gang leaders coordinate extortion rackets and relay threats via mobile phones.

SEE ALSO: Feeding the Beast: MS13 in Nashville

Midway through 2024, authorities reinforced security at the notorious prison known as El Infiernito (“Little Hell”). The Interior Ministry also sought the dismissal of 102 guards accused of granting prisoners substantial privileges, including access to weapons, air-conditioning units, and live animals.

But when Guatemala’s Attorney General’s Office failed to pursue the allegations, it left the ministry with no choice but to retain the employees accused of corruption. It was a reminder that Guatemala’s Attorney General, Consuelo Porras, who faces international sanctions over her efforts to prosecute Arévalo, would do little to support the government’s anti-gang campaign.

Despite these challenges, Guatemala closed out 2024 with a modest decline in its homicide rate. But extortion remained widespread, with authorities registering over 25,000 reported cases – up 39% from 2023. 

The Gangs Push Back 

The first sign of gang retaliation came when Barrio 18 and MS13 staged coordinated riots at two prisons in August 2025, killing one guard and taking others hostage. The gangs were protesting the transfer of several top leaders to another jail, where they were placed in solitary confinement.

Barrio 18 followed up two months later with an audacious prison break, during which some 20 gang members escaped over several days, sparking a nationwide manhunt. 

The breakout triggered a political crisis, leading Interior Minister Jiménez and two of his deputies to resign. It also exposed failures in prison security and prompted authorities to investigate whether the escape had been facilitated by corrupt guards.

SEE ALSO: Guatemala Country Profile

Days later, Guatemala’s Congress passed an anti-gang law designating Barrio 18 and MS13 as terrorist organizations, increasing penalties for gang-related crimes, and authorizing the construction of a new maximum-security prison. The legislation marked a shift toward a more punitive security approach.

Outside the prisons, authorities were also grappling with violence in Guatemala City, as the MS13 clashed with a smaller gang over control of drug retail and extortion rackets.

Amid the unrest, Guatemala’s homicide rate grew by almost 10%. The country recorded 3,139 murders in 2025 – an increase of 270 on the previous year – with much of the violence attributed to gang-related killings. 

Embracing Emergency Powers

An eruption of gang violence at the start of 2026 proved the final straw for the Guatemalan government, which subsequently invoked emergency powers to regain control.

The decision followed riots at three prisons, during which gangs took more than 40 hostages and killed several police officers on patrol in Guatemala City. Officials said the attacks were coordinated by gang leaders seeking retribution after the government refused to grant privileges to gang leaders behind bars.

The government regained control of the prisons shortly after announcing the state of emergency on January 18. Over the following month, the measures enabled authorities to carry out thousands of arrests — including more than 80 alleged gang members, according to official figures.

The government pointed to a short-term drop in homicides and extortion as evidence that the strategy was working.

SEE ALSO: Profiles of MS13 and Barrio 18

But Arévalo’s resort to emergency powers signaled his flagship security strategy had produced the opposite of its intended result. In attempting to target gang leadership, the government instead exposed its limited capacity to do so, forcing a shift toward more hardline measures.

Arévalo announced that a 15-day state of prevention would follow the expiration of the emergency decree, allowing authorities to continue targeting gang leaders in prisons and using the military for domestic security. 

The measures keep restrictions on freedom of movement but no longer permit authorities to make arrests without a warrant.

The temporary nature of these measures raises questions about whether the government can prevent further gang retaliation, given the institutional weaknesses and entrenched corruption exposed by the prison riots and gang attacks.

Arévalo’s turn toward tougher security policies reflects a broader pattern in Latin America, where tough-on-crime approaches have gained political traction in countries such as El Salvador, Chile, and Costa Rica.

Featured Image: A soldier patrols during a state of emergency triggered by an escalation of gang-related violence on the outskirts of Guatemala City, Tuesday, Jan. 20, 2026. Credit: AP Photo/Moises Castillo.

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