With the United States weighing up a military intervention to remove Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro from power, the criminal organizations aligned with the regime could soon face a critical choice: protect their economic interests or stand by their political patrons.
In Venezuela, Maduro has built a hybrid state, where in many parts of the country, criminal groups assume security and governance functions as well as control criminal economies in partnership with elements of the state. As US saber-rattling toward Venezuela looks ever more likely to end in a duel, the role of these groups in Venezuela’s future could prove crucial.
On December 2, US President Donald Trump told reporters military strikes on land targets in Venezuela would start “very soon” in the latest escalation in what the US government has framed as a military campaign targeting drug trafficking operations it alleges are led by Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. Trump’s comments came days after he had declared Venezuelan airspace should be considered closed in a social media post addressed to “Airlines, Pilots, Drug Dealers, and Human Traffickers.”
Earlier that week, the State Department formally designated the Cartel of the Suns (Cartel de los Soles) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, which US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth told media would bring “a whole bunch of new options” to the US military campaign. Although the term Cartel of the Suns more accurately describes a system of patronage and corruption that allows military and political actors to profit from drug trafficking, the US government characterizes it as a transnational drug cartel and terrorist group headed by Maduro and his closest political allies.
These latest moves come amid a growing military buildup off the Venezuelan coast and a series of military attacks against suspected drug trafficking vessels, several of which departed from Venezuela, according to the US government. Since September 2, the US military has destroyed at least 21 boats, leaving at least 80 dead, according to InSight Crime’s own monitoring.
Trump has also authorized the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to conduct covert operations inside Venezuela, according to a New York Times report that was later acknowledged by the president himself.
The deadly US military strikes against alleged drug-carrying vessels in international waters mark an aggressive escalation in US counternarcotics policy. See InSight Crime’s timeline of the strikes here.
Faced with the growing threat of military intervention, the Venezuelan government has denounced US aggression on the international stage, characterizing operations as a “campaign of harassment and threats” and accusing the United States of seeking to seize Venezuela’s oil wealth. At home, meanwhile, he has sought to rally defenses against any potential military intervention.
In a televised address, President Maduro warned that any invasion attempt would be met with “the country’s greatest defense.” This includes not only the armed forces but also the Bolivarian Militia, a civilian force with a reported 4.5 million members, though its military capacity is more symbolic than operational.
However, in addition to the state security forces and civilian militias, Maduro may also look to non-state armed groups to protect his regime. Maduro has built a hybrid state, where in many parts of the country, criminal groups assume security and governance functions as well as control criminal economies in partnership with elements of the state. Certain actors, such as the armed political groups known as colectivos and guerrilla groups like the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN), have assumed the role of administering justice, regulating social order, and acting as security forces in some regions.
These groups are present in at least 10 states and many of Venezuela’s major urban centers, according to InSight Crime’s research and fieldwork in Venezuela.
Below, InSight Crime explores the capacities, roles, and territorial presence of these non-state armed groups in a hypothetical scenario of US military intervention.
Colectivos: The Urban Guard
The armed political groups known as colectivos have long used violence to defend the Maduro regime, but their increasingly criminal profile and limited military training raise doubts over whether they have the capacity or the willingness to confront a foreign force.
Across Venezuela, colectivos operate as a network of dozens of armed political groups with a presence in urban areas in multiple states, including Miranda, Lara, Portuguesa, Táchira, Anzoátegui, and Bolívar. Their concentration remains strongest in Caracas, where neighborhoods like 23 de Enero host some of the country’s most established structures. Among the most prominent groups are La Piedrita, Tres Raíces, Oswaldo Arenas, Alexis Vive, and the Cuadrillas de Paz (Cupaz), which were created by the government to bring colectivos networks under closer state control.
The colectivos emerged as armed actors after the 2002 coup against former President Hugo Chávez. At that time, the government provided community groups with roots in social movements and civil organizations with weapons and resources.
Over two decades, these groups evolved from community organizations into paramilitary forces tasked with maintaining the status quo. They have also operated as frontline enforcers in repressing protests and intimidating opposition voices, including politicians and activists. During the 2017 anti-government demonstrations, for example, colectivos were deployed on motorcycles to disperse crowds, attack protesters, and target local opposition leaders.
In addition to their role in political repression, they have acted as tools of social control in working-class neighborhoods, where they carry out surveillance, gather intelligence, and shut down dissent.
With Maduro’s rise to the presidency in 2013, their criminal transformation intensified. Many colectivos began to engage in both legal and illegal economies, such as extortion and the control of black markets.
“I would say for the last five years – since a little before the pandemic – these groups have been focused on doing business,” said a human rights defender who has documented their activity, and who spoke to InSight Crime on condition of anonymity.
That’s one of the reasons why they weren’t very active in the July 28 conflict,” he added, referring to the role colectivos played during the wave of political repression that followed the allegedly fraudulent presidential elections that concluded with Maduro’s re-election.
This shift in the colectivos’ modus operandi has muddied their role as protectors of the revolution. Although they still maintain territorial control at the urban level, access to weapons, and ties to security forces, their function has shifted from political activism to being profit-driven power brokers at the local level. Some retain the capacity to organize and deploy their social base, but their relationship to the regime is increasingly transactional.
While their on-the-ground knowledge, integration into the communities, and decentralized structure might give them an advantage in the event of an urban battle, there are doubts about their willingness to fight. Faced with a possible US intervention, many are likely to prioritize agreements that guarantee their survival and control of their illicit economies over ideological defense.
“I have serious doubts that these coletivos will play a fundamental role in a resistance. Not only doubts about their training and capacity, but also about their willingness to be killed for defending the government,” the human rights defender added.
However, even if the colectivos do not fight to defend Maduro,, they will not evaporate after his downfall. For years, these groups have fused political activism with criminal enterprise, anchoring themselves in neighborhoods where they have established themselves as de facto authorities. Their territorial and armed control, their financial streams, and loyal social bases make it likely the colectivos will remain entrenched players that any future government will have to contend with.
The Border Protector
The ELN guerrillas were founded in Colombia in the 1960s but in recent years have established themselves across strategic regions of Venezuela to the extent that they can now be considered a binational armed group. The guerrillas cooperate with elements of the Maduro regime, providing territorial, social, and political control in return for access to criminal rents from illegal mining, drug trafficking, and cross-border trade. However, while the ELN has been a vocal political supporter of the Chavista political project, it remains unclear how far the group would go to defend the Maduro government.
A significant portion of the border between Colombia and Venezuela is controlled by the ELN. The guerrillas are now the main authority at many of the clandestine crossings in the states of Apure, Zulia, Táchira, and Amazonas. Thanks to this territorial control, the ELN also controls the flow of various legal and illegal goods, including cocaine shipments, entering Venezuela from Colombia, essentially functioning as a paramilitary customs authority and regulator of the drug trade. However, its presence now extends well beyond the borderlands, with consolidated structures in states such as Monagas, Bolívar, and Anzoátegui.
The ELN has a highly organized military structure in which each front enjoys considerable operational and economic autonomy. This design has strengthened the group’s ability to expand, adapt, and sustain long-term operations. This decentralized model has also allowed the ELN to replicate itself across large territories, consolidate local power, and maintain a steady flow of resources without depending on a single command node. The group is organized into eight war fronts, three of which are active inside Venezuela: the Northern, Eastern, and Northeastern Fronts.
The ELN has been waging war in Colombia for more than six decades, giving it substantial battlefield experience, a high level of combat readiness, and significant firepower. This long trajectory has sharpened the group’s tactical discipline, expanded its weapons capabilities, and enabled it to maintain a standing force capable of controlling extensive territories.
While many of the group’s relationships with the Venezuelan state revolve around economic interests, it also shares a level of political affinity with the Maduro government, particularly in its anti-US rhetoric, and guerrilla leaders have suggested they may be willing to take up arms against any US intervention.
“If Trump attacks Venezuela, we will have to see how we respond, but it’s not just us. [It’s] all of Latin America because I am sure there are going to be many, many people who will grab a weapon and fight because it’s too much. The fact that the United States can step over people without respecting their self-determination has to end,” said alias “Ricardo,” an ELN commander in the Catatumbo border region, in an interview with Al Jazeera.
The ELN’s criminal capacity and territorial control have made it a key strategic military, criminal, and political ally for Maduro, and it would represent a formidable opponent if it mobilizes to defend the regime. However, the group’s presence remains primarily limited to border and jungle areas in the country’s interior, having not yet extended to the coastal regions and urban areas that would likely be the main targets in any US military advance.
Furthermore, the ELN’s interests in Venezuela are more strategic and criminal than political, and its level of commitment to the regime is unclear. Recent clashes with Venezuelan troops in Táchira and Zulia reveal limits to its alignment with the government, raising doubts as to whether the ELN would go as far as confronting the United States on the regime’s behalf.
Regardless of how a foreign military intervention might unfold, the ELN is positioned to endure in Venezuela long after any change in power. Its commanders have spent years extending territorial control, recruiting local residents, and establishing themselves as the primary authority throughout the border region. Their income from mining, drug trafficking, and contraband—combined with a deeply rooted local presence—means their capacity to operate in Venezuela does not rely exclusively on their connections to any central government, and they would remain a significant security threat regardless of the fate of Maduro.
